more like partnership than merger.
2 Married persons hold property and incur liability together but also remain distinct individuals. A spouse may incur liability on her own behalf or as an agent for the other.
In many situations, whether a married person is financially responsible for her spouse's debt is a simple question of personal liability under contract or other law. Suppose one spouse wants to buy a motorcycle on credit. If the other spouse co-signs the loan, both spouses are directly liable to the creditor, even though only one of them rides the motorcycle and even though they think of the loan as solely his responsibility. In some situations, one spouse becomes liable for the other not by consent but rather by imputation. Suppose a married person defrauds a business associate and becomes liable in tort. If the tortfeasor acted as agent for the other spouse or on behalf of their marital partnership, then the other spouse is liable by imputation.
Consider what is at stake in imputed marital liability cases. Imputation spreads liability from one spouse to both. The pool of assets available to satisfy the creditor's claim also expands to include the other spouse's property. 3 This expansion is important when the directly liable person is insolvent.4 The other spouse and the creditor both have a powerful argument against the debtor that they should not be responsible for his conduct. But his insolvency inescapably requires one of them to bear it.5 If the other spouse loses her property to the creditor, she acquires a right of reimbursement against the insolvent spouse and his insolvency becomes her problem. On the other hand, a finding that a directly liable spouse acted solely as an individual protects the other spouse and her assets from risk of loss to his creditor. His creditor ends up with all the loss while the other spouse bears none.
Under what circumstances should one spouse's liability be the other spouse's problem? Today, married people can to some extent set the scope of their shared marital enterprise and their financial responsibility for each other by agreement. 6 Imputed liability, however, is a legal construct imposed on the couple without their consent, at a creditor's request. It is generally beyond the couple's power to control by private agreement. 7 This Article explores the historical and modern role of marital agency law in defining a critical aspect of what it means to be married-the scope of spouses' imputed liability for each other to third parties. Part II explains how the emergence in the nineteenth century of married women's legal capacity was driven in part by demand for a reliable legal mechanism to shield assets invested in marriage from the claims of husbands' creditors. Part III considers the scope of marital agency and shared liability under the modern view of marriage as a voluntary partnership among equals, terminable at the will of either. Spouses' financial responsibility for each other to third parties varies widely among jurisdictions. The variety reflects differences in spousal property rights among marital community and non-community property regimes. It also reveals the absence of a consistent theory of the scope of shared risk and reward relative to spouses' individuality within marriage. Part IV offers an explanation for the persistent complexity of the law governing creditors' rights against married people. Even in the context of divorce, in which the partnership metaphor is most robust, we lack consensus on the legal effect of Feb. 4, 1992) (agreement couple executed after marriage excluding husband's earnings from community property was effective only between the spouses and not against the IRS as wife's creditor). But see Calmes v. U.S., 926 F. Supp. 582, 588 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (prenuptial agreement recharacterizing spouses' income from community to separate property was effective against IRS).
marriage on a couple's legal relationship with each other. This void complicates not only divorce but also the related question of the scope of spouses' shared responsibility to third party creditors during their marriage. Despite the daunting complexity of marital agency law, it is a mirror of judicial and legislative attitudes about the balance between public and private regulation of intimate relationships. And, it is an undeniably powerful instrument of social policy.
II. THE EFFECT OF MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY REFORM ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS AGAINST MARRIED PEOPLE
Until reform in the nineteenth century, marriage created an aggregate of two individuals dominated by one of them. Under this theory of marital unity, the husband owned and controlled nearly all the couple's wealth. 8 As a legal and practical matter, married women were isolated from market activity. Without legal capacity or property of their own, married women were hardly worth creditors' attention. Only husbands could become liable to a creditor. Creditors enjoyed recourse to the full extent of his property, which included interests he acquired from his wife by virtue of marriage.
Although, in theory, a married woman lacked legal capacity as an individual, 9 she existed as a legal person for some purposes. She could act as an agent for herself and her husband in emergencies, such as "when her husband [was] imprisoned for life or for years, or [had] fled the country or been exiled. " 1 o Moreover, married women enjoyed derivative legal capacity as retail consumers. A married woman could bind her husband and the wealth he controlled by a contract for "necessaries" as if he had incurred the obligation directly."1 To reconcile the legal construct of marital unity of person with the doctrine of necessaries, courts commonly explained a husband's indirect liability for necessaries as a corollary of a husband's common law duty to sup-port his wife.12 A wife's legal agency for her husband lurked unmistakably. Whether a particular debt was for "necessaries" depended on the economic circumstances and expectations of the particular couple, rather than an inflexible standard based on wives' minimal expectation of support. 13 During the early nineteenth century, social and economic change became a dominant theme in Americans' lives.
14 Families increasingly encountered entrepreneurial and tort liability, presenting a range and magnitude of risk far greater than consumer debt for necessaries. 15 The wage labor force grew and families grew increasingly dependent on income without the safety net of a real property portfolio. Change in the type and level of risk facing families affected their 12 6 (1985) (describing factors that "marked the crucial transition of the family from a public to private institution" including a shift in family economics from production to consumption, decline of generational influences, new fertility patterns and declining family size, emerging domestic egalitarianism as a challenge to patrimony, and "a more clearly defined use of private property as the major source of domestic autonomy"); DAVID J. Russo, FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES: A NEW VIEW OF AMERICAN HISTORY 4 (1974) (noting that changes occurred economically, socially, politically, and culturally); AMY DRu STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CON- wives in antebellum New York was far removed from the agricultural world of baron and feme in medieval England. New Yorkers lived amidst an intricate network of speculation, credit, insurance, stocks, and wages which was subject to economic organization in a way that made change in marital law inevitable. 16 At the time, however, marital law was highly inflexible. Under the Blackstonian theory of marriage as merger, a husband could incur debt only as an agent for his marriage and not as an individual. 17 Nor could he easily segregate "marital" wealth into a distinct asset pool shielded from risk of loss from his creditors. Married couples needed a low cost, accessible, and reliable way for one of them to take risk without exposing all their wealth to creditors.
The first response was judicial. Courts recognized limited, equitable property rights for married women as a means of segregating family wealth from the husband's creditors. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, a couple with legal advice could opt-out of a prospective husband's marital prerogative over a wife's property rights by conveyance of property (typically by her father or her husband) to her "separate estate" established via an express or implied trust for her benefit.' 8 Even without agreement between the spouses, in response to foreclosure, some courts reserved a priority equitable interest for a married woman in personal property she owned prior to, or inherited during, marriage.1 9 The sole purpose of recognizing priority for a
See Isidor Loeb, The Legal Property Relations of Married Parties: A Study In Comparative Legislation in 13 STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC LAW
11, 12 (Faculty of Pol. Sci. of Columbia Univ. ed., 1900) ("The changes in the industrial system had affected the economic organization of the family, and it was inevitable that the legal relations [of husband and wife] should accommodate themselves to the new conditions."). Historian Lawrence Friedman noted that in England, the common law was geared to the landed gentry but in mid-nineteenth century United States, "the middle-class family was at the core of the law" and English land-based legal regimes were "too cumbersome, technical, and expensive for this class to use or tolerate." FRIEDMAN The manipulation of property rights to protect some of a married couple's property interests from market risk was not a new idea.
2 1 In the colonial period, some American jurisdictions had adopted the English common law joint marital estate, tenancy by the entirety, as a device for segregating family wealth from the claims of creditors.
22
Blackstone explained that because husband and wife were one person under the law, they could not hold property jointly in a true concurrent estate, but only "by the entireties."23 The wealth-shielding effect of estate by the entirety is analogous to that of an equitable separate estate. A husband cannot alienate or encumber it unilaterally. Nor could a creditor of only one spouse partition property held by the entirety by foreclosure during the other spouse's life without her consent. [Vol. 87:373 commodification of real property rights led to homestead legislation to protect real property from the claims of non-family creditors.
2 5
As nineteenth century economy exposed families to unprecedented risk of liability, marital law made married women entirely dependent on their husbands. At the same time, their social and legal status rendered them impotent to monitor or control their husbands' disposition of family resources. 26 Courts openly protected married women's right to financial support as morally superior to husbands' creditors' claims as an appropriate intervention into market relationships over which wives had no control. 27 To creditors, however, courts' solicitude for wives' financial security appeared as a populist maneuver that suborned fraud, undermined commerce, and preserved a bygone social order.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, judge-made law governing creditors' rights against married people and their property was a labyrinth. 28 Calls for clarity fueled political support for marital property reform legislation. 29 One historian notes that although the While it is necessary for family government, and also to the relation to the rest of society, in which the husband and wife may stand, that there should be but one will to govern, and one owner of property, yet there are great abuses as well as hardships growing out of that rule, which courts of law can not correct, or relieve, and equity therefore will interpose, and give redress. One of these hardships is the suffering of the wife and children, from the imprudence of the husband, and equity will often relieve it, by providing for the maintenance of the wife, especially out of an estate originally belonging to her in her own right. 28. A court noted with understatement that the validity of implied or expressed trusts for the benefit of married women against husbands' creditors was a matter of "considerable nicety. advance for the personal liability of both. Note that creditors who can bargain can contract with both spouses and eliminate the risk of a loss from a subsequent inter-marital property transfer from the debtor spouse to the other spouse. For example, a home mortgage lender can insist on the personal liability of both spouses and recourse to their respective interests in the real property collateral as a condition to the credit. Or, a creditor can set interest rates to take the risk of ex post marital wealth-shielding into account. Married women's property reform changed the playing field for tax and tort creditors and certain holders of entrepreneurial debt who did not bargain for shared liability in advance. These creditors previously enjoyed automatic access to all of a married couple's wealth simply by asserting personal liability of the husband. Reform made it easier for married couples to shield some wealth from creditors by private allocation to the wife's separate estate.
Creditors affected by reform responded by challenging inter-marital property transfers as fraudulent. Fraudulent transfer law quickly became as complicated and uncertain of outcome as the equitable property doctrines that reform had laid to rest. For example, some jurisdictions treated a gift of property from a husband to wife as though it were made "in consideration of marriage." The legal effect was to turn a wife from a donee transferee into a purchaser for value, and to blunt the husband's creditors from avoiding the transfer on fraudulent transfer grounds.
3 5 Some states recognized inter-marital gift transfers as presumptively non-fraudulent so long as the transferor/husband was not insolvent at the time of the transfer. 36 [Vol. 87:373 including New York, followed the contrary English rule, which held that any gift transfer by a person who was indebted at the time of the transfer was fraudulent as to existing and subsequent creditors, even though he did not become insolvent until later.37 Meanwhile, lawyers, courts and legislatures were mired in the unintended consequences of married women's property reform. 38 In a second wave of reform in the post-Civil War period, legislatures clarified an aspect of married women's legal individuality by recognizing a married woman's right to control wages she earned for work outside the home. 39 Proponents of married women's wage legislation argued that it extended to working class married women the financial security separate estate legislation afforded women in wealthy marriages. Income a married woman earned outside the home could afford her economic security against her husband's creditors.4 0 One commentator has noted that courts interpreting wage legislation excluded the value of services a married woman provided for her family from the scope of 'wages' subject to her control. A woman's work in her home was her marital duty and the value of such work continued to be her husband's property as an incident of marital status.
4 1 For wives who did not own property before marriage, acquire it by gift or inheritance during marriage, or work outside the home, this second wave of reform legislation provided a victory in principle but little protection against husbands' improvidence or indifference.
Legal recognition of married women's property rights focused creditors' attention on the boundary between individuality and marital partnership that the unity model of marriage had long obscured. A profound hypocrisy appeared between property and marital law. Title to property was a matter of individuality, whereas control of property was a matter of marital status. Some early reform legislation did not address at all a married woman's legal capacity to control her separate property or incur obligation on the strength of it, perhaps supporting the inference that legislatures expected reform to have no effect on marriage. For example, New York passed legislation in 1848 that at- Even after reform, marriage not only stripped a woman of her right to control property, it obscured her control of and responsibility for herself. Under pre-reform common law, a married woman could commit a tort, but her husband was liable for it. His liability followed logically from the construct of marriage as a unity of persons and the husband's marital dominion over her person and her property.
4 3 His personal liability for her tort was ordained by marital status, not agency law. His personal liability and wealth provided the sole source of the tort victim's compensation for injury she caused. 44 Reform recognized married women's capacity to hold title to property and opened the corollary possibility that married women might also incur liability as individuals. The possibility became a thorny practical and theoretical problem in tort cases involving married women defendants. To the extent that reform legislation addressed spouses' liability for each other's torts at all, it relieved husbands' from their marital liability for wives' torts. 45 with produce grown on the family farm on her way to market. 53 Under Indiana's married women's property law, she was liable for her own torts as if she were unmarried, except for torts "committed under her husband's direction or in his presence with his consent," in which case, the spouses were jointly liable.
5 4 The plaintiff argued that the wife was her husband's servant and that the tort occurred within the scope of their master/servant relationship. The court expressly rejected the plaintiffs characterization of the defendant's marriage as a master/servant relationship. It noted that while she acts "within her proper domestic sphere," a wife is not a servant to her husband.55 The court offered no alternative characterization of their relationship.
Similarly, in, McNemar v. Cohn,56 the plaintiff sued both husband and wife for damage to buildings caused by a trash fire the wife set behind the couple's store. Illinois law had abrogated common law liability of a husband for the torts of his wife, "except in cases where he would be jointly responsible with her if the marriage did not exist."
The court dismissed the agency-based claim against the husband noting that although the wife helped her husband by maintaining the family home and working in the store, she was not his agent for fire starting purposes.58
Creditors' assertion that the husband was vicariously liable for his wife's tort based on agency between them required courts to interpret the effect on third parties of the 'new' marital relationship. In Radke, the court found the wife's discretion in household matters to be "within her proper domestic sphere" as a wife, and legally distinct from that of the typical servant, for whom the master is vicariously liable. In McNemar, the court cleverly dodged the issue. Even if the wife was the husband's servant for house and store keeping, her negligent fire starting was outside the scope their marital master/servant relationship and thus outside the range of the husband's vicarious liability. Both courts may have viewed creditors' agency arguments as an affront to husbands' newfound freedom from liability for their 53 [Vol. 87:373 wives' torts. For creditors, though, husbands' new freedom was a radical setback but for the possibility of agency. 59 Without a way to spread a wife's liability to her husband, a wife's tort creditor typically faced an insolvent defendant, no claim against her husband, and no recourse to his property.
A recurring question in all jurisdictions was whether a married woman's legal capacity to hold legal title to property separate from her husband included the power to act as a surety for her husband. (Her liability as surety gave her husband's creditor recourse by foreclosure to her separate property.) 60 For example, in 1896, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a married woman could bind her separate property by contract, but her husband could not bind her personally or subject her separate property to his creditors' claims by his contract. 6 1 Because she had legal capacity and control over her separate property, however, she could by her own act become a surety for her husband's debt and thereby expose her separate property to his creditor. The wife may now be "the head of the family" as respects homestead rights and exemptions. She is equally entitled with her husband to the guardianship of the offspring of the marriage in case of separation, and she may have an absolute divorce, with alimony, almost for the asking, because of "extreme cruelty"; which falls far short of personal chastisement or restraint of liberty. Even if not divorced, public sentiment will not tolerate that she be compelled to abide with him, although she be destitute of provocation or excuse for doing otherwise, and his criticism of her conduct must not exceed approval by the refined manners of "polite society." We think that so nearly a complete "emancipation" of the wife must in an equal degree emancipate the husband also, and free him from obligations that were incident to a state of law and society that has vanished before the progress of modern ideas. 60. See generally Loeb, supra note 16, at 34-36 (noting that some states imposed restrictions on married women's capacity to act as surety for husbands based on legislative perception of "feminine weakness ....
[A]nd the probability that her confidence, which she so freely accords, may be taken advantage of... where both spouses signed a promissory note for a community debt, the creditor had the personal liability of both spouses, but no recourse to the wife's separate property. While a married woman could bind herself personally for separate debt incurred for her exclusive benefit, she lacked capacity to become a consensual surety for her husband's debt or for the debt of the community.
6 3 In 1903, the Idaho legislature amended its community property law to afford a married woman control over separate property coextensive with that afforded to married men. 64 However, the Idaho Supreme Court continued to hold that a married woman lacked legal capacity to incur liability on the strength of her separate property when she acted as surety for her husband on his separate debt or on community debt.65 In 1939, the court explained its narrow interpretation of married women's legal capacity as a means of protecting married women given the non-egalitarian reality of marriage.
6 6 Oddly, the protection extended only to preclude unsecured creditors from foreclosing on her separate estate. Idaho law did not protect a married woman from the consequences of a pledge of her separate property by mortgage or security interest to enhance her husband's credit.
6 7 In 1977, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed a long line of decisions and recognized that a married woman's capacity to incur personal liability by contract extends to contracts of suretyship for her husband.68
In community property jurisdictions, married women could hold title to property either as a member of the marital community or individually, separate from the marital community. 69 legal emancipation increased the possibility that either spouse could incur liability individually or as an agent for the marital community.
The new permutations exponentially increased the complexity of the effect of an individual's marital status on his credit relationships. An important challenge for creditors of community spouses was obtaining the right to foreclose on community property to satisfy one spouse's tort liability. As in non-community property jurisdictions, communal ownership of property did not correspond with the shared right to control it. With some exceptions, community property jurisdictions recognized the husband as having the exclusive right to manage and transfer nearly all the couple's community personal property. 70 By the early twentieth century, however, most community property states had enacted significant limitations on husbands' unilateral property control rights. For example, in New Mexico, California, Arizona and Texas, the husband's "head and master" control right excluded community real property as to which joinder of both spouses was required.
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During the same period, other community property jurisdictions made creditors' recourse to community property depend on whether the debtor had the right to manage it, not whether he held exclusive title to it. The effect of this "right to manage" approach was to afford creditors of husbands with broad access to community property coextensive with the husbands' broad statutory rights to manage it. For example, under California law, each spouse held a "present, equal and existing" interest in community property. 72 Until the mid-twentieth century, the husband held the exclusive right to manage community personal property other than the wife's earnings or property she acerty with community property changes separate to community property and all property obtained by either spouse during marriage is presumptively community property. See W. S [Vol. 87:373 dissolution of marriage. They balked at the prospect of partitioning community property for a creditor's benefit, in many cases, subjecting the non-debtor community spouse to the loss of her financial security. Community property should be "left intact for the support and maintenance of the family" and should not be depleted during the marriage "for obligations not incurred for the benefit of the family."78 This theme, that a spouse's inchoate interest in community property was morally superior to the creditor's foreclosure interest, reflected a glaring flaw in the theory of marital community. Husband and wife were not in fact one, but rather two. Despite the utopian metaphor of the marital community, either spouse was and is legally entitled to incur liability benevolently for the betterment of the community or recklessly and selfishly to its detriment.
79 Some jurisdictions took on the task of differentiating between fact and theory in creditors' foreclosure actions. One resolution was to permit a creditor of only one spouse to foreclose on community property only if the debtor spouse incurred the obligation for the benefit of the marital community. Under this approach, creditor recourse to community property turned on an assessment of the nexus between the liability and the marriage. A creditor holding "community debt" could reach community property; a creditor holding a spouse's "separate" debt could not. In the latter case, the creditor would have the debtor's personal liability and recourse by judicial process to the debtor's separate property but not to either spouse's interest in community property. the couple bore the burden of showing that it did not benefit the community. 8 2 As for tort liability incurred by only one spouse, however, jurisdictions varied widely in their approaches to characterization of the debt as "separate" or "community."
8 3 The benefit of tort liability to a couple was considerably more difficult to assess than that of contract liability, for which the couple usually received capital, property, or services. Courts approached the characterization of tort liability as "community" or "separate" based on a fact-driven balance of equity between the tort victim and the non-debtor spouse. For example, a plaintiff injured by the negligence of a husband driving a cab for hire could reach the couple's community property on the theory that the husband operated the cab for a financial return for the benefit of the marital community.
8 4 A husband who lied in a corporate real estate transaction acted for the benefit of the community so that the plaintiff could foreclose on corporate stock the couple held as community property.
8 5 On the other hand, a court found that a husband's liability for alienation of the plaintiffs wife's affections was not of benefit to the community, and protected his wife's interest in community property from the plaintiffs foreclosure action.
8 6 Also, a husband's liability for burning down a community-owned business in an attempt to collect insurance money and liability was his separate obligation.
8 7 Over time, jurisdictions adopting the debt-characterization approach relaxed the required nexus between a tort obligation and the community ceedingly difficult, for the statutes of the different states are all at sixes and sevens" In not a single case has this court held or intimated that community property, whether real or personal, can be subjected to levy to satisfy a judgment against the husband alone for a tort committed by him alone, and not in connection with the community business nor for the benefit of the community. [Vol. 87:373 and effectively expanded one spouse's tort creditor's recourse to all community propertyss
The strategic implications of rules governing creditor recourse to community spouses' property are apparent. If marital property law limits a creditor's recourse by foreclosure to his or her debtor's separate property, a person can use marriage as a wealth shield. For the price of a marriage license, a person can transform his interest in property that would have been available to his creditors into community property safe from his creditors, but happily within his control. 8 9 On the other hand, if one spouse's creditor has a right to foreclose on community property regardless of the circumstances in which the obligation was incurred (as in jurisdictions that afford creditors recourse to all community property the debtor had a right to manage), then the debtor's marital status would appear to some observers as a boon for creditors at the expense of the debtor's spouse. To the extent the debtor spouse can expose all community property to his or her creditors' recourse unilaterally, the other spouse's legal individuality and his or her "present and equal" interest in community property effectively disappears. This result is clearly at odds with the premise of marriage as a community of equal and legally distinct individuals.
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All approaches to creditor recourse to community property addressed the latent question of the scope of marital agency. In community property jurisdictions, creditors enjoy a special "back door" to the non-debtor spouse's interest in community property. A creditor of a community spouse can foreclose on community property the debtor has a right to manage, or whenever the liability benefits the community, without showing that the debtor spouse incurred the liability as an agent for the other spouse. It is important to note that this "back door" to community property does not make the non-debtor spouse personally liable for the other spouse's debt. Nor does it expose the 88. See Werker v. Knox, 85 P.2d 1041, 1042 (Wash. 1938) (noting a trend "quite definitely in the direction of finding ways and means of imposing such liabilities upon the community"). In Werker, the court held that liability from the wife's negligent operation of the family car was a community debt. Creditors used married women's individuality to challenge the theoretical foundation of the marital estate of tenancy by the entirety. Tenancy by the entirety reflects a uniquely marital unity of title premised on the unity of person model of marriage. Both spouses hold an undivided one half interest in tenancy by the entirety property. And a creditor of only one spouse cannot partition it to foreclose on the debtor spouse's interest while the couple remains married without the consent of the other spouse.
9 2 In 1900, the Nebraska Supreme Court found tenancy by the entirety out of step with the post-reform marital relationship: "The old common-law idea of the oneness in the relation of husband and wife is fast disappearing. The identity of the woman is not lost in her husband. She is no longer under his dominion or control.... The chasm between married women's individuality for purposes of title to property and their legal right to control it persisted for more than a century after reform. Husbands typically held title to the couple's wealth and enjoyed nearly unilateral power to control it, except for limitations such as statutes that recognized wives' rights in 91 94 In a 1967 law review article, a scholar noted that "the community property system vests the control and management of the common property in the hands of the husband, as the partner who due to economic and biological factors is more practiced and experienced in the acquisition and management of property."95 During this period, married women experienced a scissor effect from married women's property reform. They gained individuality for purposes of property rights, liability, and agency. They enjoyed no corresponding expansion of their legal or practical rights to control property or their husbands' conduct. Even so, by the end of the first half of the twentieth century, judicial solicitude for wives' economic plight in creditors' rights cases became muted. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, middle class couples were clearly using wives' separate estates as an asset protection strategy to shield wealth from husbands' creditors. 96 The new rhetoric in these cases became legal, not equitable. It focused on the legal independence of spouses and the corresponding possibility of an agency or partnership between them as a means by which she and her separate property might be liable for his debt. Ironically, a married woman's legal (but not practical) independence from her husband and his risky behavior became a weapon in creditors' hands to undermine her efforts to protect herself by accumulating a nest egg in her own name. The possibility of an egalitarian partnership between husband and wife captured public attention in 1930 when the U.S. Supreme Court considered the effect of asserted marital partnerships in two income attribution tax cases. In both cases, married couples asserted that they were partners as justification for attributing salary earned by the husband to both. In Lucas v. Earl, 9 7 the Court rejected such an agreement as a sham. 98 The income was the husband's and was taxable entirely to him notwithstanding their private agreement otherwise. In contrast, in Poe v. Seaborn, 9 9 the Court validated a Washington couple's agreement to share income as a valid partnership. Despite the husband's exclusive power to control community property in the form of his income, 10 0 the Court held that Washington law gave the wife a present property interest in it, which she could contribute to their marital partnership.
1 0 1 The cases reveal a gap between the legal property rights of married women vis-'-vis their husbands and the prevailing view of marriage, under which wives typically depended on their husbands for support and deferred to their management and control of property. In the first case, the Court held that the husband's income was his and no agreement between the spouses could change that for income tax purposes. In the second, the Court deferred to state community property law on the income tax issue, even though by all other accounts, the husband's earned income was "his" and not really "theirs."
In 1946, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the key attributes of a marital partnership for the purpose of income attribution were shared contribution to, and control over, a business enterprise or investment 97. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 98. 'There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it." Id. at 114-15. 99. 282 U.S. 101 (1930). 100. The Poe court stated that:
The reasons for conferring such sweeping powers of management on the husband are not far to seek. Public policy demands that in all ordinary circumstances, litigation between wife and husband during the life of the community should be discouraged. Law-suits between them would tend to subvert the marital relation. The same policy dictates that third parties who deal with the husband respecting community property shall be assured that the wife shall not be permitted to nullify his transactions. Id. at 112. 101. The U.S. Attorney General had issued several opinions treating a California wife's interest in community property as a "mere expectancy contingent on her husband's death" but treating a wife's interest in community property in Washington, Arizona, Texas and other community property states as a "present vested" interest. Two years later, Congress ended the crisis that the prospect of marital partnership had posed to the income tax system. It permitted all married couples to attribute income earned by either to both on a joint tax return with joint tax liability, regardless of who actually owned or controlled the income.
4
Joint return legislation solved the marital partnership problem for income taxes. It left undisturbed, however, the Court's view that a couple's shared investment in their marriage could not invoke partnership consequences absent an arm's length relationship between the spouses in which both agreed to share ownership and control of property in an enterprise that was distinct from the ordinary shared financial enterprise of marriage. "Real" partnership required an agreement based on legal and financial equality between the participants, a circumstance mid-twentieth century observers thought was usually missing between spouses.' 0 5
III. SPOUSES' RESPONSIBILITY FOR EACH OTHER UNDER MODERN MARRIAGE
In the last half of the twentieth century, the American labor market changed. Educational and employment opportunities for women expanded.1 0 6 And women advanced toward political and legal equal-102. Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 290 (1946) . "[T]he wife drew on income which the partnership books attributed to her only for purposes of buying and paying for the type of things she had bought for herself, home and family before the partnership was formed." Id. at 291-92. The husband controlled the income generated by the alleged partnership exactly as he had prior to its formation; the wife took no part in management of the business. . 1956) , the court protected a wife from imputed liability for her husband's business debt although she participated in management of the business. Mrs. Knox had no "voice" in the operation of the business even though she described it to third parties as "our" business, kept the business books, and used business revenue to pay the couple's household expenses. 
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ity as legislatures and courts dismantled legal regimes that had been based on the premise of women's economic inferiority to men. 10 7 Married women earned an increasing portion of family income. 10 8 One commentator explains that for most married middle class women who chose to work outside the home, "the decision to get up early, drop the children off at daycare, and head to the office or factory was [at least in part] .... a calculated attempt to give their families an economic edge."1 0 9 Social attitudes about the role of women as mothers and caregivers within marriage also changed. In 1970, 78% of younger married women thought that "it was better for wives to be homemakers and husbands to do the breadwinning."11o By the end of the twentieth century, only 38% of American women described a lone full-time parental care-giver for children as "ideal"; nearly 70% of adults believed that the gender of the stay at home parent was irrelevant."' lure working women out of the labor force, the percentage of women working outside the home continued to grow. Id. at 94. Chafe notes that in the 1950's women in the labor force were increasing at a rate four times faster than men. Public opinion about the social role of marriage also changed dramatically. Reform in the late twentieth century abandoned fault as prerequisite for divorce and diminished it as a factor in parties' postdivorce financial relationship.112 Today, most commentators assert that the function of divorce law is not to punish transgressing spouses for their antisocial behavior, but rather to make a "clean break" for the couple financially.113 Divorce law prescribes the process of reconciling spouses' claims against each other. The process and principles of divorce allow the couple to disentangle their individual interests from their marriage, dissolve their joint investments, and go their separate ways.
114 While a couple is married, however, the scope of one spouse's responsibility for the other to a third party is not purely a private matter between the spouses. Divorce law reform did not change the effect of a marital relationship on creditors-at least not directly.
A. Status-Based Shared Liability
Even though divorce law reconstructs marriage as a contract at the will of the parties, marital status-the fact that two people are married-triggers shared financial responsibility to third parties without regard to the parties' private agreement. In other words, in some circumstances, an insolvent spouse's liability is the other spouse's problem simply because the couple is married. Today, perhaps the most economically significant source of status-based shared liability is for debt either spouse incurs for "necessaries." Two-thirds of the states retain the common law doctrine of necessaries, including five of the nine community property jurisdictions.
11 5 Some jurisdictions have one spouse may sue both spouses, execute against property of contracting spouse, and if insufficient property is found, recover from property of non-contracting adopted "family expense" statutes that impose liability on both husband and wife for designated family expenses incurred by either of them. 1 16 These laws impose a range of shared financial responsibility on spouses, regardless of their private agreement as to who between them will bear the risk. Driver insolvency in automobile accidents prompted the emergence of the "family purpose doctrine" by which courts imposed one family member's tort liability on other solvent family members based on family activities as joint enterprise. Under this doctrine, family members were de facto agents of one another for operation of the family automobile, and also shared financial responsibility for tort victims of the joint enterprise. 117 Today, permissive use and mandatory automobile insurance legislation address the problem of driver insolvency, and many jurisdictions have abrogated the common law family purpose doctrine. [Vol. 87:373 but generally recognize a "separate but equal" right for each spouse to control some forms of community property. 119 Note that unlike tenants in common who cannot alienate or encumber the other tenant's interest without his or her consent, in jurisdictions that match creditor recourse to community property to a community debtor's right to control it, either spouse's creditor has recourse to all community property that spouse has a right to control. 120 munity.123 A recurring problem arises when the debt is tort liability which does not appear to "benefit" the community. If the tort liability is not a community debt, the tort claimant cannot recover against a married tortfeasor who holds only community property. For example, Washington common law generally protects community property from creditor recourse to satisfy the separate debts of either spouse. 124 In deElche v. Jacobsen,1 25 a spouse incurred separate tort liability, but his separate property was insufficient to satisfy the victim's claim. Under the general rule, the court faced a Hobson's choice: allow recourse to community property to satisfy separate liability incurred by one spouse absent "benefit to the community," or protect all community property at the expense of the tort victim even though the tortfeasor is solvent, albeit with wealth "tied up" in community property.
12 6 The court gave the tort victim recourse to community property for the separate debt. At the same time, it gave the tortfeasor's spouse a right to reimbursement against the tortfeasor for any loss to her interest in community property. Her right against the debtor spouse would be secured by an equitable lien enforceable upon termination of the community.1 
B. Imputed Liability
As we have seen, spouses' prerogative to hold wealth either as individuals or jointly within marriage makes it possible for spouses to adopt a private allocation of wealth for the purpose of shielding some assets from risk of loss to creditors. To respond to this strategy, creditors of an insolvent spouse argue that the other spouse who is not directly liable (and her separately-held property interests) should be liable by imputation. Where the liability at issue is not one for which spouses share liability by virtue of marital or family status, creditors must show a partnership or other agency relationship between spouses to impute one spouse's liability to the other.
Partnership and agency law tend to allocate loss an insolvent debtor cannot absorb to the party whose relationship with the debtor affords him a relative advantage in insuring against or preventing the loss in the first place.1 28 For example, the term "partnership" refers to a mutual agency relationship in which participants act as agents for each other to carry on a shared business enterprise. 129 Persons who intend to be partners are agents for the partnership and are vicariously liable for each other's conduct within the scope of the partnership. 130 The fact that two persons co-own property and share the profits and losses it generates is not enough to establish a partnership with corresponding shared liability. both ownership and control of an enterprise.1 32 The legal right to control an enterprise gives a participant who does not incur direct liability an opportunity to monitor, control, and insure against loss from the other partner's conduct within the scope of their shared enterprise. This opportunity gives the other participant an advantage in preventing or insuring against risk of loss from the debtor's conduct over a creditor who has only a credit relationship with the debtor. Shared ownership creates an incentive for one participant to control the behavior of the other. Shared right of control makes it possible for her to do so relatively cheaply. Whenever the combination of incentive and right to control the debtor makes the other participant the cheaper bearer of risk of loss (relative to the creditor), imputed liability tends to be the efficient allocation.13 3 A creditor can argue that even though two people are not partners in a common enterprise, one of them authorized the other to act as her agent with respect to a particular risky activity. Absent evidence of an express agreement as to actual authority between principal and agent, 13 4 a court can find authority by implication (apparent authority) based on the perspective of the creditor who deals with the directly liable person (the actor).' 3 5 The principal is vicariously liable for the actor's conduct if the creditor reasonably believed the actor had authority to act on her behalf and the creditor's belief is "traceable to a
132. An association is a partnership if the participants are carrying on a for profit business as co-owners. Id. § § 101(6), 202, at 61, 92-93. Bromberg & Ribstein observe that the shared ownership and control test is more subtle than it appears. Profit sharing is "probably the most important element" whereas shared right to control is "also important" but "somewhat more elusive because of the many gradations of control and because partners often delegate decision-making power." BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 2.07. [Vol. 87:373 manifestation of the principal." 1 36 The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Agency note that apparent authority aligns the private relationship between the principal and agent with the impression they give reasonable observers. "A principal may not choose to act through agents whom it has clothed with the trappings of authority and then determine at a later time whether the consequences of their acts offer an advantage." 137 An alternative argument for imputed agency by implication is agency by estoppel or ratification.1 3 8 One party cannot deny that the other acted as her agent if she: 1) failed to use ordinary care to control the other party; 2) that failure enabled the other party to create a reasonable misperception of agency in a third party; and 3) the third party changed its position in reliance on that misperception. Shared liability by ratification implements restitutionary principles. One person may be liable for another if she knows about, and accepts, the benefits of the other person's act with knowledge after the fact. Apparent authority is an essential adjunct to actual authority in enabling third parties to deal effectively with organizations .... [It] enables persons who interact with the organization to treat the agent's act or statement as dispositive, without further inquiry directed elsewhere within the organization, in the absence of circumstances suggestive of self-dealing or other irregularity. One person's silence and inaction with knowledge that another person purports to act for his benefit may constitute a manifestation sufficient to justify imposition of vicarious liability on him whenever the third party reasonably believed the principal acquiesced in the directly liable person's actions. See id. § 3.03 cmt. b. 138. The difference between liability based on authority by implication and liability based on ratification or estoppel is that the latter does not require a manifestation of authority on the part of the vicariously liable person to the third party. 139. Id. § 2.05. Vicarious liability based on estoppel, also known as ostensible authority, recognizes that one person (the principal) can become liable for the acts of another based on the principal's failure to exercise ordinary care. The principal's own failure to use ordinary care "enables the agent, or an actor who purports to be an agent, to misrepresent the agent's authority . Such a person will be treated as though she authorized both the reward and the risk of his action before the fact.141
E.g., BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN
The easiest statement to make about the existence and scope of marital partnership or agency is also the most general. Marital status alone does not establish that spouses intend to share ownership, control, and risk of all property interests held by either of them as partners. It does not establish a mutual agency such that the act of one is always the act of both.142 Yet, like any two legally distinct individuals, one spouse can act as agent for the other. Although the couple's marital status is not dispositive, a couple's financial integration and behavior within the context of their marriage is relevant to determining the existence and scope of an implied partnership or agency between them. 143
Some common themes appear in marital agency cases. First, it is clear that marriage matters. Some courts continue to recognize the distinction between "simply married" and "also partners" that the Supreme Court raised in the income tax cases. They differentiate between the ordinary financial integration typical between entrepreneurial partners (which supports imputation of liability) and marital integration (which does not). For these courts, sharing of ownership and control of assets is consistent with the couple's intention to be married. It does not support an inference of their shared intention to manage an investment or business together as a partnership. [Vol. 87:373 shop business. 1 4 6 "[W]ith respect to a husband and wife, co-ownership of property and the sharing of business profits do not demonstrate a partnership because those arrangements are common in marriages."14 7 Because Mrs. Barmes was not Mr. Barmes' partner, but was merely his wife, she was not personally liable for the business's withholding tax debt. 148 Absent evidence that Mrs. Barmes "helped to run the business," the court treated the tax liability as exclusively Mr. Barmes's and protected Mrs. Barmes and property titled in her name from IRS recourse.1 49 The unexplored issue in cases like Barmes v. I.R.S. is how a court is to determine whether a couple is "simply married" or "also partners" for purposes of imputed liability. What kind of interaction between spouses divides ordinary marital sharing from a partnership? Marital agency cases reveal no clear line. Instead, courts evaluate each couple's behavior against an unspoken norm of socially desirable marital behavior. At some point, a couple's relationship stops looking like "just marriage," and begins to look like strategic wealth-shielding only incidentally accomplished within a marriage.
For example, in In re Tsurukawa,15 0 the debtor's husband set up a corporation in her name and used it to defraud his employer of more than $2 million. She executed corporate and bank documents in which she identified herself as the sole owner of the corporation. She wrote checks on the corporate bank account and used the corporate credit card for family expenses.151 The couple used the fraud proceeds to buy two additional houses and new cars.' 5 2 After the fraud victim 146. Id. at 1009. The IRS asserted liens against both spouses individually on the theory that Barbara's Gift Shop was a partnership between the spouses and that both spouses were individually as its general partners. 16 2 The legal question posed by this argument is whether she accepted the benefits of his fraudulent conduct with sufficient knowledge so that his liability should be imputed to her. The level of knowledge that is sufficient for this purpose varies among jurisdictions. Some courts impute one spouse's fraud liability to the other based on ratification only if the other retains the benefits with actual knowledge of the fraud. 163 Others presume the requisite knowledge of the fraud on proof of circumstances that would have put a reasonable person on inquiry as to the source of the benefit.164
In Tsurukawa, the wife charged hundreds of thousands of dollars on the corporate credit card and checking account and dramatically improved her family's standard of living.165 The court noted that under California law, "persons who reap the benefits of a partnership must also be subject to its liabilities."
166 So too, a spouse who receives The plaintiff sued a husband and wife for building supplies the husband purchased on credit for use in a contracting business.168 The wife knew the husband bought supplies on credit. She enjoyed a share of income from the building business. Yet, the court held she was not vicariously liable for the debt. In this setting, the couple's sharing of the risk and reward of the business was simply marriage and not partnership.1 6 9 "The fact that money generated by the building business provided Mrs. Seay and the Seay children with their support and income .... shows only that Mrs. Seay received the maintenance and support which she was entitled to receive from her husband under the law."170 Her failure to disaffirm his debt did not constitute ratification.l 7 1
In a case involving a passive and trusting husband, Schenectady Trust Co. v. Castelli,172 the court held that he did not knowingly accept the benefits of a home improvement contract on which his wife had forged his signature. 173 Although the husband was aware his wife had contracted for the improvements and stood by silently when sale transaction, or that the wife knowingly ratified the transaction even though it was outside the ordinary scope of partnership business. [Vol. 87:373 the contractor worked, the court held that he did not know his spouse incurred liability on his behalf. When the couple discussed the improvements and the husband asked whether they could afford them, his wife told him "not to worry about the money."174 Without explanation, the court vaidated the husband's trust in his wife. The creditor was left with no right to foreclose on the husband's interest in their
property.175
The conflict between social policy that protects marital collaborative behavior and that which enforces creditors' rights appears starkly in tenancy by the entirety cases. Recall that a creditor with the personal liability of only one spouse cannot force partition of tenancy by entirety property except by imputing liability to the other spouse.
176
If the other spouse has expressly or impliedly consented to the debt, however, both are personally liable and their tenancy by the entirety property is subject to the creditors' recourse.
Tests for marital agency between tenants by the entirety vary among jurisdictions. Under Pennsylvania law, if both spouses benefit from the debt, either spouse is presumptively the agent for the other. This treatment is similar to community property jurisdictions that afford creditor recourse to community property based on whether the debt was incurred for the benefit of the community. 177 In contrast, Missouri law does not presume agency between spouses. Rather, to establish agency, a creditor must prove the knowledge and active participation of the passive spouse in the liability producing transaction.' 78 Whether one spouse incurs credit card debt with the implied consent of the other spouse similarly varies depending on the law of the jurisdiction whose law governs the contract. Only a few reported opinions consider the extent to which a court may impute one spouse's credit card debt to the other. One reason might be that credit card issuers can easily obtain the personal liability of both spouses by bargain. They do not present as compelling a case for imputed liability as tort and tax creditors who cannot bargain in advance for the liability of both spouses. For example, in Providan National Bank v. Ebarb,180 the court found that evidence that the husband occasionally paid the wife's monthly credit card bill "did not establish his approval, full knowledge, or intent to assume personal liability for the debt [his wife] had incurred."1
IV. THE EFFECT OF CHANGE IN MARRIAGE ON MARITAL
AGENCY: SOME OBSERVATIONS Legislative reform to marriage that recognized married women's separate estate could not be confined solely to de jure property rights for married women. It launched a long and continuing process by which courts reconcile the effect of spouses' marriage on their relationships with creditors.
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, marriage changed again to reflect a relatively abrupt change in the political and economic status of women.
18 3 Marriage no longer strips women of their legal capacity as individuals or subordinates their voice in the management of property. Yet, it has not become just another form of unincorporated association. As we have seen, a debtor's marital status affects his credit relationships. The doctrine of necessaries and family expense statutes impose shared liability on spouses. And married people are subject to property regimes and rules regarding imputed liability that are distinct from those that apply to non-marital associations. From the perspective of some observers, recent developments in the evolution of marriage may appear to have made it indistinguishable from assent based partnership. From creditors' perspective, however, marriage remains notably different than non-marital collaboration.
It is easy to use the metaphor of marriage as a partnership to describe the relationship between the spouses. Applied to individual spouses' obligations to third parties, however, the label "partners" proves an uncomfortable fit for several reasons. First, two person partnerships present an inescapable governance problem-deadlock.l84 Absent contrary agreement, partnership law generally imposes majority rule for breaking deadlock. 185 Two person partnerships, however, cannot resolve disputes by a majority vote, as there is no majority. Once the partners agree on the ground rules for 183 partnership operations, one partner cannot unilaterally change them, short of dissolution of the partnership. 8 6 For example, suppose spouses agree on an ordinary course in which one partner can incur liability for a certain range of projects on behalf of both. The partner with authority can continue to incur liability on behalf of the partnership within that ordinary course, even though the other partner changes his or her mind and would prefer to retract the initial authorization. 1 8 7
Until the last part of the twentieth century, the deadlock problem was not much of a problem in marital relationships. By both law and custom, one spouse-the wife (with some exceptions)-was excluded from the legal right to make decisions or take action on behalf of both spouses. Even after married women's property reform, courts were reluctant to find partnership or agency between spouses who did not legally or practically share control over risk.' 8 8 Under modern marriage, however, husbands no longer legally dominate wives in management decisions. Yet, no "tie-breaking" rule has emerged to replace the old "man-wins" rule. Instead, courts employ agency doctrine to determine, on a case by case basis, whether one spouse acted individually or as agent for the other within the scope of their shared enterprise.
A marital relationship is also different from a non-marital partnership on the issue of scope. A non-marital partnership typically has an express or relatively discernable business purpose and an "ordinary course" that marks the boundary between partners' common enterprise and their individual pursuits. The action of a partner within the scope of this ordinary course is an act of the partnership for which both partners are individually liable. In contrast, the scope of a marital partnership is hard for a stranger to the marriage to see. Marriage encompasses the range of human activity we think of as "personal." It embraces a multitude of overlapping projects, including home maintenance, child-rearing and management of financial affairs. It is not limited to a discernable, finite, profit-oriented objective such as developing a shopping mall or operating a law practice. Indeed, when mar-186. The inability of one partner to unilaterally retract mutual authority distinguishes a two person partnership from an agency relationship between two people. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § § 118-119 (1958) (a principal may retract authority of an agent to act in a particular manner at any time). A person who is an agent for another person, but not a partner with him, acts for the exclusive benefit of the principal and is therefore subject to the principal's unilateral control. In contrast, a partner is an agent for the partnership in which he or she shares an interest, and only an act of the partnership can retract his agency. 187. BROMBERG [Vol. 87:373 ried people coincidentally undertake such a discrete financial project together, we tend to isolate the project as their "business" as distinct from their "marriage." Moreover, the ordinary course of non-marital partnerships is stable compared to the ordinary course of a marriage, which can change from moment to moment in ways that are difficult for a creditor to perceive. Detecting the presence of an agency relationship or the existence of a partnership (and shared liability) in nonmarital cases is difficult enough. Cases are highly fact specific and difficult to reconcile within, or across, jurisdictions. Adding marriage to the mix only adds to the complexity. In practical terms, the challenge for courts is to navigate the wide sea between two extremes. On the one hand, treating all marriages as partnerships and all conduct of either spouse as on behalf of the partnership would reinstate Blackstone's merger model for marriage. It would also negate an important political and economic function of married women's property reform-the ability of spouses to shield some of their joint investment in marriage from an individual spouse's creditors' reach. On the other hand, treating all conduct of either spouse as entirely individual, with no possibility of agency or imputed liability, both ignores the collaborative reality of marriage and encourages inefficient wealth-shielding conduct.
The course between the two extremes requires courts to interpret and draw inferences regarding the reasonableness of spouses' conduct against an archetype of marriage. The archetype of reasonable marital behavior reflects the courts' sense of prevailing social and legal expectations arising from marital status. Marital partnership is sui generis in part, perhaps, because collaboration within marriage has a long and persistent social function distinct from non-marital collaborative forms. In their treatise on partnership law, Alan Bromberg and Lawrence Ribstein note that the courts' challenge in detecting a partnership between married people is that "aspects of the relationship that would otherwise resemble partnership take on a different coloration in the family setting." 1 8 9 The marital relationship, and norms about what conduct is socially valuable and therefore reasonable between spouses, colors its legal characterization for purposes of imputed liability.
The persistent special treatment of marriage for purposes of imputed liability inescapably reveals much about the legal meaning and social value of marriage. This function of marital agency is disturbing for some observers who prefer to view marital status as no more than a sentimental label. For example, some observers see the doctrine of necessaries and family expense statutes as serving no purpose other 189. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 2.10. The same ambiguity appears when the basis of imputed liability is not partnership but agency.
than as "collection devices" for creditors.190 This criticism rests on the unspoken premise that marriage has no external effect or social value other than as an expression of the individual spouses' private agreement. The persistence of a sphere of marital collaboration shielded from shared liability under modern legal and economic conditions strongly suggests that marriage, as a collaborative form, retains a unique social value. Marital agency cases make it clear that courts continue to recognize the unique social value of the stability of marital relationships. Even after mid-nineteenth century reform, marriage remained distinct from non-marital partnership by its nearly mandatory term-till death do us part. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, divorce law reform afforded spouses a right to dissolve a marriage more closely akin to a non-marital partner's right to dissolve a partnership. As divorce becomes less costly for a financially dependent spouse, the threat of divorce during marriage logically becomes a more effective lever to control the other spouse's behavior.1
9 1 Yet, even under a no- [Vol. 87:373 fault, equitable distribution divorce regime, marriage remains distinct from non-marital partnership for purposes of imputed liability. Put another way, courts do not find a spouse financially responsible for her choice of spouse under the same standards that would apply to a non-marital partner's choice of partner. The reason for this may be that terminating a marriage is not analogous to termination of a non-marital partnership. In a case of deadlock, ending the marriage is the only legally effective mechanism to end risk of shared liability to third parties. Divorce yields negative effects, especially to children, that the dissolution of business partnerships does not.
Until the late twentieth century, marital status may have been a useful heuristic for socially valuable investment in child rearing. And investment in child-rearing activity (given women's alternatives) required economic specialization within marriage. Women tended to specialize in child care which rendered them and their children physically and economically dependent on men. Under these conditions, women had little choice but to trust and defer to husbands' financial decisions. Under this one-size-fits-all model for marriage, it was possible to identify "ordinary" marital behavior, and to hold up ordinary behavior in the face of ordinary vulnerability as justification for a protective imputed liability rule for trusting, deferential wives. Today, marriage is no longer the sole legal locus for child rearing. Nor are women as dependent on men to support and protect them and their children. Yet, the marital relationship remains sui generis for purposes of shared liability to third parties. Put simply, despite change in economic conditions and divorce law, courts continue to expect marriages to last beyond deadlock over asset management strategy. This view is evident in marital agency cases, even if it is fading or absent in legal discourse about divorce. For example, when a creditor seeks to impute liability to the other spouse based on agency by ratification, a court may discount the spouse's failure to prevent the risky behavior by threatening divorce because it views her threat of divorce as a socially undesirable tool of control over the other spouse.193 When a spouse's behavior appears to the court as reasonable behavior within the context of marriage, the court will characterize her failure to monitor, control, or repudiate the conduct of the other spouse as appropriate and ordinary marital trust and deference. In other words, this type of deferential behavior is characteristic of what married people should do. However, when the court characterizes a spouse's behavior as unreasonably deferential, the couple's private allocation of assets and risk will appear as "judgment-proofing," or less pejoratively "asset protection."1 94 Rather than determine the existence and scope of marital agency directly, courts appear to reason backward from the desired result. Thus, a spouse who trusts and defers to a fraudulent spouse is protected from shared liability to his creditor (no agency) whenever such behavior is "merely" marriagethat is-consistent with the archetypal, reasonable marital relationship. The effect of protection from shared liability in such a case encourages such behavior between spouses by subsidy at the expense of a creditor.19
5 Under other circumstances, one spouse's trust of, and deference to, the other appears unnecessary and unrelated to the social value of marriage. Under these conditions, the court finds an agency relationship, and the trusting spouse shares the risk of loss the other spouse's conduct creates as a partner would.
The challenge for courts in imputed marital liability cases is to distinguish socially valuable conduct between spouses from opportunistic wealth-shielding behavior. This is a daunting task. Whose perception should govern? The spouses deny that one acted on behalf of the other. The creditor, who is a stranger to their marriage, must construct the inference to be drawn from their relationship notwithstand-193. A court might find that a spouse who chooses to remain married and silent rather than confront her spouse and provoke inevitable deadlock over his conduct has not impliedly authorized or ratified her husband's conduct by her silence. E.g., Zickgraf Hardwood Co. v. Seay, 298 S.E.2d 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982). 194. Twenty first century families exploit wealth shielding options unknown to their nineteenth century counterparts. Indeed, marriage as a wealth-shielding strategy has notably declined in utility as marriage has become increasingly transitory. Modern asset protection strategies involve creation of limited liability partnerships or other entities to hold "family" wealth legally separate from the family members who control it and their creditors. [Vol. 87:373 ing the couple's self-serving testimony. The effectiveness of creditors' arguments depends upon the discretion of a court with no particular legal expertise in marriage or divorce. The result is a swamp of decisions, without consistent justification, in which no case offers useful guidance for the next. To make matters even worse, individuals' consumer debt and entrepreneurial risk levels continue to rise relative to income. As the legal significance of marriage becomes increasingly unpredictable, the stakes for creditors and their married debtors in imputed liability cases are higher than ever. As states adopt domestic partnership laws that extend marital liability and property regimes to registrants, creditors will call upon courts to impute liability from one domestic partner to the other.1 9 6
Just as imputed liability cases identify reasonable behavior within marriage, cases alleging imputed liability between domestic partners will define the scope of shared domestic partnership liability and a critical aspect of what it means to adopt the legal status of domestic partner. As domestic partnership evolves as a social phenomenon, courts will reveal the archetype of reasonable domestic partner behavior, and the level of trust and deference within domestic partnerships that is "just what domestic partners should do." Courts, not sweeping legislative initiatives, will define in each case the social value of investment in domestic partnerships relative to creditors' rights. At the same time, they will determine the social value of domestic partnerships relative to the tradition of marriage.
V. CONCLUSION
Although marriage has changed from a legal status to a customized private relationship between spouses, change in marital agency has taken its own pace. Courts continue to differentiate between ordinary marital collaboration and partnership or agency between people who, coincidentally, happen to be married. While commentators debate who may marry and the optimal legal regulation of divorce, courts define, without fanfare, the legal effect of a person's marriage on his creditors and the relative social value of marriage as a collaborative form. 
(2006).

